Hegel’s Conceptual Group Action on Creative Dynamics in Music by Mazzola, Guerino & Mannone, Maria
GU E R I N O  MA Z Z O L A ,  MA R I A  MA N N O N E
Hegel’s Conceptual Group Action
on Creative Dynamics in Music
Was  die  Wahrheit  ist,  ist  weder
das Sein noch das Nichts, sondern
dass  das  Sein  in  Nichts  und  das
Nichts in Sein — nicht übergeht,
sondern übergegangen ist.
Ihre  Wahrheit  ist  also  diese
Bewegung des  unmittelbaren
Verschwindens des einen in dem
anderen: das Werden.1
G. W. F. HEGEL, WISSENSCHAFT DER LOGIK, I.
1. Introduction
n  Musical  Creativity,2 we  have  presented  a  model  of  musical  creativity  and  given  a
number of examples, reaching from music theory to musical composition and music
technology. We shall give a short description of the model’s main components in the
section  2.3  of  this  paper  (entitled  “The  Conceptual  Box  Structure”).  Although  those
examples  confirm the  validity  of  the  model,  there  is  one  single  component,  where  the
model is still abstract and far from operational in terms of concrete actions to be taken.
This component can be described using the common metaphor of the “box”, which has to be
opened in the creative process. In our model, the box is realized by what we call a “critical
concept”. The decisive step is then to identify the box’s “walls” and to open them. We are
fully aware that there is a major debate on creativity. Our position in this context can best
be traced from our book, in particular from chapters 17, 18, 19, and 20. The present paper
however focuses on a specific methodology of acting in a creative way, not on the general
I
1 GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL,  Wissenschaft der Logik,  Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 19782 (G. W. F. Hegel:
Werke in zwanzig Bänden, 5), I, p. 83 («The truth is neither being or nothing, but that being does not pass
over, but has passed over into nothing, and nothing into being. Their truth is therefore this  movement of
the immediate vanishing of the one into the other: becoming», GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, Hegel’s Science of
Logic, trans. by Arthur Vincent Miller, London, Allen & Unwin – Amherst (NY), Humanities Press, 1969,
p. 83).
2 Cf.  GUERINO MAZZOLA -  JOOMI PARK -  FLORIAN THALMANN,  Musical  Creativity.  Strategies  and Tools  in Composition and
Improvisation, Berlin – Heidelberg, Springer, 2011.
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debate. This paper also does not claim to be a philosophical discourse, but we make use of a
philosophical  approach  to  delineate  a  general  method  to  develop  creativity  in  a  very
practical way.
This decisive step is what remains quite abstract in our previous work. The present
paper presents a mechanism that is designed to catalyze that step by offering a concrete,
but generic body of concepts and the action of a group of transformations of this body, a
toolbox that should offer a set of operational perspectives onto the critical concept’s walls.
As was already pointed out in our book,3 that the comprehension of such a mechanism for
creativity is not a sufficient condition for effectively producing creative results, it is only
meant to be a fairly important and useful procedure for creative actions.
We are deducing the conceptual body and the group action from the first paragraphs
of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Wissenschaft der Logik.4 This might be a logical approach
since Hegel’s initial dynamics in his logical architecture is in fact strongly related to the
concept of “concept”, i.e., to the basic structure of any concept. This is plausible since his
incipit of thoughts claims to be the very beginning of the action of thinking, and in this
moment, the very nature of conceptualization is at stake. We shall discuss Hegel’s text and
deduce the conceptual body we are proposing, a body built from six concepts which we for
good reasons call Hegel’s body, it is denoted by �. The group that acts on � will be called the
Hegel group, it is denoted by �. We give a precise definition of these objects in sections 2.1
and 2.2 (“Hegel’s  Initial  Thought Movement in  Wissenschaft  der  Logik” and “The Implicit
Group Structure”).
But it is of course also highly problematic to deduce a mathematical structure such
as a group action from Hegel’s text since the basic situation of that incipit is far from being
given a  shape that  could  presuppose  mathematical  concepts  for  its  description.  This  is
correct, and we shall see that our mathematical concept framework is not requiring set
theory, group theory and similar conceptual architectures. We simply use these concepts
because  they  describe  in  their  simplicity  (which  doesn’t  require  the  full  mathematical
formalism) what Hegel implies in his philosophical prose. Insofar, it is our claim that Hegel
implicitly uses some very simple operations that our small group � (it is a Klein four-group)
comprises.  We  leave  it  to  philosophers  to  discuss  our  approach  in  terms of  what  they
consider being a valid argument with regard to  Hegel’s  thought dynamics.  We are  also
3 Cf. ibidem.
4 Cf. G. W. F. HEGEL, Wissenschaft der Logik, cit.
– 72 –
Hegel’s Conceptual Group Action on Creative Dynamics in Music
aware of the still problematic state of Hegel’s text, a fact that has been discussed through
the history of philosophy to the present.5 However, we believe that our precise setup could
help avoid those well-known rhetorical deformations of dialectic argumentation which has
often generated nothing more than ex post circumlocution of results that had been gener-
ated by totally different methods.
It could be argued that we should also consider Hegel’s writings on musical aesthet-
ics. This paper is however not focusing on Hegel’s ideas about music, we only use his very
primordial  ideas  about  how we start  thinking.  Logically  speaking  these  ideas  are  inde-
pendent  of  later  developments  in  other  Hegelian works.  This  is  Hegel’s  own approach,
whose very beginning of  thoughts are set  up in his  initial  sentences  of  Wissenschaft  der
Logik.6
Among the six basic concepts in the Hegel body, namely being, nothing, space, time,
fact, and gesture, the latter plays a dominant role in what follows. Although we should not
presuppose higher mathematical concepts here, we believe that it is advantageous to recall
the precise definition of  a  gesture which we have given in  the mathematical  theory of
gestures (in music),7 since in the examples of this paper, this definition will be used.
A gesture refers to two structures, a directed graph ∆, the gesture’s “skeleton”, and a
topological category X, the gesture’s “body”, see Figure 1. A gesture, denoted by δ : ∆ → X, is
a map that assigns to every vertex v of ∆ an object  δ(v) in  X, and to every arrow a of ∆ a
continuous functor δ(a) : ∇ → X from the unit interval (category) ∇ = (I, ≤), I = [0, 1], to X in
such a way that the configuration of arrows is conserved by the configuration of functors.
This  means  that  if,  for  example,  the  head  y of  arrow  a is  the  tail  of  arrow  b,  then
δ(a)(1) = δ(b)(0).
5 See for example ACHIM ILCHMANN, Kritik der Übergänge zu den ersten Kategorien in Hegels “Wissenschaft der Logik”,
«Hegel Studien», XXVII (1992), pp. 11-25.
6 Cf. G. W. F. HEGEL, Wissenschaft der Logik, cit.
7 Cf. GUERINO MAZZOLA - MORENO ANDREATTA, Diagrams, Gestures and Formulae in Music, «Journal of Mathematics and
Music:  Mathematical  and  Computational  Approaches  to  Music  Theory,  Analysis,  Composition  and
Performance»,  I,  1  (2007),  pp.  23-46;  GUERINO MAZZOLA,  Categorical  Gestures,  the  Diamond Conjecture,  Lewin’s
Question, and the “Hammerklavier” Sonata, «Journal of Mathematics and Music: Mathematical and Computa-
tional Approaches to Music Theory, Analysis, Composition and Performance», III, 1 (2009), pp. 31-58.
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This paper is structured as follows: in section 2.2 (“The Implicit Group Structure”),
we introduce and discuss the Hegel body  � and the Hegel group  �. In section 3, “The  �
Action  on  the  Yoneda  Model  of  Creativity”,  we  discuss  the  Hegel  group  action  in  the
mathematical model of creativity that refers to Yoneda’s lemma in category theory. Section
4, “The Hegel body � in the Concept Architecture of Forms and Denotators” is dedicated to a
Hegelian interpretation of the concept architecture of forms and denotators which has been
a backbone of mathematical music theory and its computerized implementation. Section 5,
“The Usage of  � for the Dynamics of Creativity”, discusses the application of the Hegel
group  action  for  the  understanding  of  creativity  in  musical  compositions,  such  as  the
fanfare in Ludwig van Beethoven’s  Hammerklavier Sonata op. 106 and the incipit of Franz
Liszt’s Mephisto Walzer. Section 6 (entitled “An Experimental Composition”) presents a small
experimental  composition  created  using  the  Hegel  group action.  Section  7  (“Still  More
Symmetries? Future Developments”) shortly discusses the question concerning additional
symmetries of the Hegel body. We should stress for non-mathematicians that a mathemat-
ical category is a different concept from a philosophical category.
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Fig. 1: The visual representation of a gesture whose body is a
simple musical instrument space.
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2. The Hegel Concept Group �
In this section we first analyze Hegel’s initial thought movements in his Wissenschaft
der Logik.8 This will lead to a conceptual configuration built from six components, together
with a group action, introducing what will be called the Hegel group �. Our scope here is
not to interfere with philosophical debates, but to elaborate a group structure that can be
used in practical creative contexts. Nevertheless, we believe that the Hegel group structure
could help understand some of the inherent dynamics in Hegel’s primordial thoughts.
2.1 Hegel’s Initial Thought Movement in „Wissenschaft der Logik”
All the following German quotations are taken from the modern German version of
his writings,9 also referenced in the online website Zeno.org.10 The English quotations are
taken from the Miller’s translation of the Suhrkamp edition,11 also referenced in the website
marxist.org.12
The Hegelian system of logic starts with these words: 
A. SEIN
Sein, reines Sein, – ohne alle weitere Bestimmung. In seiner unbestimmten Unmittel-
barkeit ist es nur sich selbst gleich und auch nicht ungleich gegen Anderes, hat keine
Verschiedenheit innerhalb seiner noch nach aussen. Durch irgendeine Bestimmung
oder Inhalt, der in ihm unterschieden oder wodurch es als unterschieden von einem
Anderen gesetzt würde, würde es nicht in seiner Reinheit festgehalten. Es ist die reine
Unbestimmtheit und Leere. Es ist  nichts in ihm anzuschauen, wenn von Anschauen
hier gesprochen werden kann; oder es ist nur dies reine, leere Anschauen selbst. Es ist
ebensowenig etwas in ihm zu denken, oder es ist ebenso nur dies leere Denken. Das
Sein,  das  unbestimmte  Unmittelbare  ist  in  der  Tat  Nichts und  nicht  mehr  noch
weniger als Nichts.13
8 Cf. G. W. F. HEGEL, Wissenschaft der Logik, cit., pp. 82-83.
9 Cf. ibidem.
10 Bibliothek Zeno, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Wissenschaft der Logik, http://bit.ly/1ueqV6p, Erstes Kapitel –
Teil A, B, C, accessed November 15th, 2014.
11 G. W. F. HEGEL, Hegel’s Science of Logic, cit., pp. 82-83.
12 Marxist  Internet  Archive,  Hegel’s  Science  of  Logic,  http://bit.ly/1Hq1d9p,  Volume  1  –  Book  1,  accessed
December 3rd, 2014.
13 G. W. F. HEGEL,  Wissenschaft der Logik, cit., p. 82 («A. Being.  Being, pure being,  without any further determi-
nation. In its indeterminate immediacy it is equal only to itself. It is also not unequal relatively to an other;
it has no diversity within itself nor any with a reference outwards. It would not be held fast in its purity if
it contained any determination or content which could be distinguished in it or by which it could be distin-
guished from an other. It is pure indeterminateness and emptiness. There is nothing to be intuited in it, if
one can speak here of intuiting; or, it is only this pure intuiting itself. Just as little is anything to be thought
in it, or it is equally only this empty thinking. Being, the indeterminate immediate, is in fact nothing, and
neither more nor less than nothing», G. W. F. HEGEL, Hegel’s Science of Logic, cit., p. 82).
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The  pure  being  is  pure  indeterminacy  and  emptiness.  Emptiness  is  a  spatial
category,  this  is  confirmed by the statement «to be thought in it»,  «it»,  the being.  The
nothingness is a spatial insight: penetrating pure being results in recognizing emptiness,
nothingness. The preposition «in» is opposed to «out». Both refer to a boundary of a region
that we cannot understand but in a spatial way. This spatial understanding is omnipresent
in conceptual architectures, such as mathematical set theory or process theory.
Therefore, to the concept of being we have to add the concept of a generic space.
Such a space cannot be the concrete physical space, at this stage it is a germ of spatiality,
nothing more. But it is a conceptual component of being and nothingness. And it is not only
a being out there, it is the action of thinking that reifies «being», it is neither object nor
subject. These are categories to be introduced later in Hegel’s system.
B. NICHTS
Nichts, das reine Nichts; es ist einfache Gleichheit mit sich selbst, vollkommene Leerheit,
Bestimmungs-  und  Inhaltslosigkeit;  Ununterschiedenheit  in  ihm  selbst.  Insofern
Anschauen oder Denken hier erwähnt werden kann, so gilt es als ein Unterschied, ob
etwas oder nichts angeschaut oder gedacht wird. Nichts Anschauen oder Denken hat
also eine Bedeutung; beide werden unterschieden, so ist (existiert) Nichts in unserem
Anschauen oder Denken; oder vielmehr ist es das leere Anschauen und Denken selbst
und dasselbe leere Anschauen oder Denken als das reine Sein. Nichts ist somit dieselbe
Bestimmung oder vielmehr Bestimmungslosigkeit und damit überhaupt dasselbe, was
das reine Sein ist.14
The  concept  of  nothingness  initiates  being  complete  emptiness,  again  a  spatial
component of nothingness, shared with being. Being was emptiness when penetrated in the
thinking movement, whereas nothingness is emptiness from the beginning. The conception,
«Anschauen oder Denken» or «intuition or thought», determines it and therefore generates
its being, the empty thought of nothingness generates its being. Nothingness is a being, and
in fact, because it is emptiness, it is the pure being where Hegel started his discourse. What
is important here is that both, being and nothingness, are created from each other by a
movement of thoughts. Reification of each one happens through a movement of thought.
This will be made explicit the following paragraph in Hegel’s text:
14 G. W. F. HEGEL, Wissenschaft der Logik, cit., pp. 82-83 («B. Nothing. Nothing, pure nothing: it is simply equality
with itself, complete emptiness, absence of all determination and content–undifferentiatedness in itself. In
so far as intuiting or thinking can be mentioned here, it counts as a distinction whether something or
nothing is intuited or thought. To intuit or think nothing has, therefore, a meaning; both are distinguished
and thus nothing is (exists) in our intuiting or thinking; or rather it is empty intuition and thought itself,
and the same empty intuition or thought as pure being. Nothing is, therefore, the same determination, or
rather absence of determination, and thus altogether the same as, pure being», G. W. F. HEGEL, Hegel’s Science
of Logic, cit., p. 83).
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C. WERDEN
a. Einheit des Seins und Nichts
Das reine Sein und das reine Nichts ist also dasselbe. Was die Wahrheit ist, ist weder das
Sein noch das Nichts, sondern dass das Sein in Nichts und das Nichts in Sein — nicht
übergeht,  sondern  übergegangen ist.  Aber  ebensosehr  ist  die  Wahrheit  nicht  ihre
Ununterschiedenheit,  sondern dass  sie  nicht  dasselbe,  dass  sie  absolut  unterschieden,
aber ebenso ungetrennt und untrennbar sind und unmittelbar jedes in seinem Gegenteil
verschwindet. Ihre Wahrheit ist also diese Bewegung des unmittelbaren Verschwindens
des einen in dem anderen:  das  Werden;  eine Bewegung,  worin beide unterschieden
sind, aber durch einen Unterschied, der sich ebenso unmittelbar aufgelöst hat.15
Hegel starts with a seemingly contradictory statement: being and nothingness are
the same. And in fact, he contradicts this statement some lines later, saying that «they are
not  the  same».  This  contradiction  can  be  resolved  if  we  view  Hegel’s  statements  as
assertions of aspects of being and nothingness, not of their full «truth». We might use a
geometric metaphor to illustrate this understanding. If one is positioned on a Moebius strip,
it is true that it has two sides, the one where one stands, and the opposed one. But one
knows that a Moebius strip has only one side. The opposed side is just a part of the front
side. This apparent contradiction is resolved when one realizes that the other side is a local
statement, while the sameness of the two sides is a global statement: one may walk from the
first to the second local side on a global trajectory.
In this sense, sameness of being and nothingness is a global statement, while their
difference is a local one. Being and nothingness are two local aspects of the same global
concept.  Hegel  offers  a  clear  method  to  perform  the  trajectory  between  being  and
nothingness: it is the movement that was already alluded to in the previous paragraphs
when Hegel described the movement between being and nothingness in the thinking action.
Now, he makes this movement explicit:  «Their truth is therefore, this movement of the
immediate vanishing of the one into the other: becoming». With this, to the basic concepts
of being, nothingness, and space, Hegel adds a next one: becoming. It is however a delicate
conceptualization since it is that movement of thought that has no subject or object yet, it is
a pure action. We therefore propose to rename this concept and to call it “gesture”, a basic
action that is not yet embedded in the dichotomy of object/subject.
15 G. W. F. HEGEL,  Wissenschaft der Logik, cit., p. 83 («C. Becoming. (a) Unity of Being and Nothing. Pure Being and
pure nothing are, therefore, the same. What is the truth is neither being nor nothing, but that being – does
not pass over but has passed over – into nothing, and nothing into being. But it is equally true that they are
not undistinguished from each other, that, on the contrary, they are not the same, that they are absolutely
distinct,  and yet  that  they are unseparated and inseparable  and that each immediately  vanishes in  its
opposite.  Their truth is therefore, this movement of the immediate vanishing of the one into the other:
becoming, a movement in which both are distinguished, but by a difference which has equally immediately
resolved itself», G. W. F. HEGEL, Hegel’s Science of Logic, cit., p. 83).
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In might seem that we have introduced the concept of a gesture in an arbitrary way.
Let us make clear why this impression is wrong. The rationale for our conceptual choice was
not to change Hegel’s terminology, but first of all to solve the apparent (onto)logical contra-
diction between Being and Nothingness. Our discourse has in fact solved the contradiction
by the  introduction of  a  new concept (gesture)  as  described above.  And it  has  done so
without leaving classical logic in favor of some more exotic logics, such as intuitionistic,
fuzzy or paraconsistent variants. Let us also remark that gestures are generically useful in
artistic utterance, but see sections 5.3 (“Escher’s Theorem for Beethoven’s Fanfare in the
Hammerklavier Sonata op. 106”), 5.4 (“The Rotation S@N as a Driving Creative Force in the
Incipit of Liszt’s Mephisto Walzer No. 1”), and 6 (“An Experimental Composition”).
The  text  is  moreover  also  specific  about  an  aspect  that  every  action  seems  to
embody: time. Hegel writes «but that being does not pass over but has passed over».16 This
reveals a time category where presence and past are distinguished. Thus, we have to add
the concept of time to the space concept in Hegel’s setup. Finally, the statement of «being
passed over» specifies a further conceptual aspect, namely that after the gestural action is
established, there is a resulting fact, the transition of being into nothingness, and vice versa.
Summarizing, we have collected a sixfold conceptual anatomy, grouped into three
pairs  of  corresponding  concepts:  Being/Nothingness  (S/N for  German  Sein/Nichts),
Space/Time (R/Z for German Raum/Zeit), and Gesture/Fact (G/F for German Geste/Faktum).
These  six  conceptual  “elementary  particles”  are  shown as  vertices  of  an octahedron in
Figure 2, we shall call them “fermions” in an allusion to elementary particle physics, where
fermions are the particles that represent matter – as opposed to forces, which are repres-
ented by particles that are called “bosons”. We are using the famous Borromean rings in
this  representation to  indicate  that  these  six  elementary  concepts  are  not  independent
from each other.  They build an irreducible body of  concepts,  which we call  the “Hegel
body”, and denote as a set (by abuse of language, since mathematical formalisms should not
matter yet) by � = {S, N, R, Z, G, F}.
2.2 The Implicit Group Structure
The evident symmetry of the Hegel body � is not by case, and it is not our invention,
but  results  from  Hegel’s  approach  as  discussed  above.  In  fact,  the  crucial  movement
between S and N is defined by the gestural becoming, G, that transforms S into N and vice
versa.  In  this  movement,  there  is  also  the  result  in  facticity  F,  that  terminates  the
16 Ibidem.
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movement and puts into its temporal past tense. This transformation may be interpreted as
a symmetry of  �, namely the 1800 rotation around the axis spanned by G and F, which we
denote by  G@F.  In Figure 2, this axis corresponds to the question “HOW?”, its rotational
action answers the question of how S is transformed into N and vice versa, namely by the
gestural action. Using our physical metaphor, the pair G@F plays the role of a boson, a force
particle that moves S into N and vice versa. This interpretation is remarkable since it gives
to pairs of fermions a role of bosons. In other words: The Hegel body � is simultaneously a
body of  material  and of  forces.  The fermions are moved by bosons,  and the bosons are
generated by pairs of fermions. This is a philosophically essential proposition as it suspends
the question of what is more elementary: movement or moved things, this is another justi-
fication of the Borromean ring visualization.
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Fig. 2: Hegel’s concept architecture, the Hegel body � = {S, N, R, Z, G, F}, and
the  � group action, where the rotational axes answer the questions: how,
what, where?
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But let us first complete the transformational setup defined by the bosonic actions:
we have three actions, each defined by a bosonic pair of fermions,
 the 1800 rotation G@F around the axis G—F, yielding the permutation (SN)(RZ)
 the 1800 rotation R@Z around the axis R—Z, yielding the permutation (SN)(GF)
 the 1800 rotation S@N around the axis S—N, yielding the permutation (RZ)(GF)
Together  with  the  identity  Id (all  of  � remains  fixed),  this  defines  a  group
� = {Id, G@F, R@Z, S@N}
of permutations of �. It is evident that this commutative group verifies x2 = Id for all x, and
x ·  y =  z for any two different x,y ≠  Id, and where  z is the third non-identity. For example,
G@F ·  R@Z =  S@N.  This group is isomorphic to the Klein four-group  K4,  but we stress the
equal roles of all three generators. This group of permutations is called the “Hegel group”.
The orbits of the group’s action are exactly the bosonic pairs.
The group structure extends the semantics of the original Hegel context, where only
the action of G@F on S, N are explicitly thematized. Let us therefore interpret the complete
action
� × � → �.
1.  G@F : S ↭ N
This is Hegel’s original movement of becoming, which he later specifies into ceasing-
to-be S ↝ N and coming-to-be N ↝ S.
2.  G@F : R ↭ Z
The gestural operation maps time to space via the time-parametrization of a gesture
(see also the mathematical theory of gestures developed in Diagrams, gestures and formulae in
music).17 The fact as a result of a gesture recreates the time that has produced the spatial
points. Let us recall here a significant statement by the great mathematician Henri Poincaré
in La valeur de la science:
Localiser un objet,  cela veut dire simplement se représenter les mouvements qu’il
faudrait faire pour l’atteindre; [...] il ne s’agit pas de se représenter les mouvements
eux-mêmes dans l’espace, mais uniquement de se représenter les sensations muscu-
laires qui accompagnent ces mouvements et qui ne supposent pas la préexistence de la
notion d’espace.18
17 Cf. G. MAZZOLA - M. ANDREATTA, Diagrams, Gestures and Formulae in Music, cit.
– 80 –
Hegel’s Conceptual Group Action on Creative Dynamics in Music
3.  R@Z : G ↭ F 
The time as a generator of spatial points (points as results of the pricking gesture) is
embodied in the gestural  movement that creates its  factual  results.  Conversely,  facts  as
spatial localizations are only thought as endpoints of a time line of a gestural movement.
4.  R@Z : S ↭ N
Being as a thinking activity in time is annihilated to nothing when fixed in to spatial
points. Conversely, points when rethought as results of the pointing action recover their
temporal origin.
5.  S@N : G ↭ F
A gesture, when taken as a being, is transformed into its resulting fact which is the
nothingness that terminates the gesture. Conversely, a fact as a nothingness, when thought
as a result of an action, recovers its generative gesture.
6.  S@N : R ↭ Z
Time,  as  the  movement  of  being  (recall  Hegel’s  becoming),  when  frozen  to
nothingness, generates spatial points, endpoints. Conversely, if a point in its nothingness (it
has no inner substance, so to speak) is rethought of what it brings to be, its being recreates
time where the point was moved to its present location. It seems adequate to recall here
Gurnemanz’s lesson to Parsifal: «Du siehst, mein Sohn, zum Raum wird hier die Zeit».19
It is evident that all these operations relate to each other, and this is essential, they
are not independent concepts, but define the irreducibility of the Borromean architecture
and, in fact, of the Hegelian setup.
Example 1: before we investigate more in depth the implications of this group action
with regard to the creativity process, it may be useful to give a first elementary musical
example of the � action. Let us look at the primitive action that a musician has to perform
to produce a sound, hitting a key on the piano, singing a note,  or blowing a tone on a
trumpet.  Such  an  action  has  three  parts:  the  initial  gesture  moving  out  from  the
nothingness of silence to the sound production, then the sound as a product, as a being that
has a factual reality, and third the termination of the sound production, the exiting gesture
18 «To localize an object simply means to represent to oneself the movements that would be necessary to
reach it; […] it is not a question of representing the movements themselves in space, but solely of repre-
senting to oneself the muscular sensations which accompany these movements and which do not presup-
pose  the  preexistence  of  the  notion  of  space»,  HENRI POINCARÉ,  La  Valeur  de  la  Science,  Paris,  Ernest
Flammarion, 1905, pp. 87-88.
19 «You see, my son, here time becomes space».
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taking back the fact to nothingness. This is exactly what the operation R@Z = (SN)(GF) does,
it permutes nothingness and being as well as gesture and fact. The operation R@Z first maps
N ↝ S and  G ↝ F ,  creating the factual  being of  the sound. Then, applied in the other
direction, it takes back S ↝ N and F ↝ G, this corresponds to the formula (R@Z)2 = Id. The
orbit of R@Z is what the creation of a sound realizes in terms of Hegelian action.
2.3 The Conceptual Box Structure
The box structure of the Hegel body � is shown in Figure 3. The box (a cube) is the
dual of the octahedron defined by the six conceptual components of  �. Each component
corresponds to a wall  of  the box. This is a perfect visualization of the principles of the
creative process which we have discussed in  Musical Creativity.20 Let us give a very short
summary of such a process:
1.  Exhibiting the open question
2.  Identifying the semiotic context
3.  Finding the question’s critical sign or concept in the semiotic context
4.  Identifying the concept’s walls
5.  Opening the walls
6.  Displaying extended wall perspectives
7.  Evaluating the extended walls
20 Cf. G. MAZZOLA - J. PARK - F. THALMANN, Musical Creativity. Strategies and Tools in Composition and Improvisation, cit.
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Fig.  3: The dual of Hegel’s concept octahedron is a
cube,  whose  six  walls  are  associated  with  Hegel’s
basic concepts.
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The metaphor of a concept’s walls is now perfectly realized by the box of Hegel’s
body,  which  we  may call  “Hegel’s  box”.  This  coincidence  is  what  we  shall  take  as  the
starting point of our approach to creativity, namely that the critical action of identifying a
concept’s walls is made concrete by Hegel’s box. This means that we claim that the Hegel
action � × � → � enables a machinery that helps identify a concept’s walls.
To realize this plan we however have to understand why the action � × � → � is a
tool that could help understand and eventually soften a critical concept’s walls. The first
observation to this end is that in Hegel’s approach, when discussing being and nothingness,
he deals with a conceptual architecture that is extremely elementary. In his words, it is
about emptiness, about the very beginning of conceptual thinking. This means that what he
proposes, and what we have drawn from his idea, is a conceptual framework that is not yet
loaded  with  any  specific  architectural  details,  it  is  “the  empty  canvas  of  conceptual
construction” that we see in Hegel’s text. This is the rationale that motivates us to use this
conceptual canvas to investigate any critical concept in a creative process’s crucial step of
wall identification.
This means that  using the Hegel  action in the analysis  of  a  critical  concept,  one
might be able to identify its walls. What we called walls in the theory of creativity 21 are the
concept’s properties, characteristics, and specificities that circumscribe it in a more or less
explicit form. In other words, what defines its inner structure, but also, what delimits it
from  other  concepts,  what  it  is  not.  Therefore,  using  the  very  basics  of  a  concept’s
conception (yes, this is circular, but this is essential in the beginning of conceptual organi-
zation), one should get a supporting machinery dealing with the identification process of
walls.
In what follows we will investigate the Hegel action from two perspectives: first, we
reconsider the mathematical model of creativity as described in  Musical Creativity22 and in
the article Towards a Categorical Theory of Creativity for Music, Discourse, and Cognition.23 Second,
we analyze the architecture of forms and denotators, which have played a major role in the
conceptual framework of mathematical music theory, as shown in The Topos of Music.24
21 Cf. ibidem.
22 Cf. ibidem, section 19.2.
23 Cf.  GUERINO MAZZOLA [et  al.],  Towards  a  Categorical  Theory  of  Creativity for Music,  Discourse,  and Cognition,  in
Mathematics and Computation in Music. 4th International Conference, MCM 2013, ed. by Jason Yust, Jonathan Wild
and John Ashley Burgoyne, Heidelberg, Springer, 2013.
24 Cf.  GUERINO MAZZOLA, The Topos of Music. Geometric Logic of Concepts, Theory, and Performance, in collaboration
with Stefan Göller and Stefan Müller, Basel [etc.], Birkenhäuser, 2002, II, section 6.
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3. The � Action on the Yoneda Model of Creativity
In category theory, Yoneda’s idea was to define a functor Yon� : � → � @, where � @ is
the category of set-valued presheaves over the category �, by assigning to each object A of �
a  presheaf  @A :  � opp → Sets defined  by  @A(X)  =  X@A(=�(X,  A))  and  for  each
morphism  f :  A → B in  � a  natural  transformation  @f :  @A → @B given  by
@f(X) : X@A → X@B : g ↦ f ◦ g. Yoneda’s lemma says that Nat(@A, F) ⥲ F(A) =: A@F, for every
object A of � and every functor F in � @. This means in particular for F = @B that A and B are
isomorphic if and only if their functors  @A and  @B are so. We may therefore replace the
category � by its Yoneda-image in � @.
Although Yoneda’s  lemma enables  the  replacement  of  a  given  category  � by  its
Yoneda-image in � @, the functor @A must be evaluated on the entire category � to yield the
necessary information for its identity. The creative moment comes in here: could we not
find a subcategory  � ⊂ � such that the functor  Yon|� :  � → �@ :  A ↦ @A|�opp is still fully
faithful? We call such a subcategory “creative”, and it is a major task in category theory to
find creative categories which are as small as possible. One may even hope to find what we
call  an  “objectively  creative  subcategory”  for  a  given  object  A in  �,  namely  a  creative
subcategory  � such that for this given object  A in  � there is a creative diagram  DA in  �
whose colimit � is isomorphic to A. Intuitively, a colimit of a diagram of spaces is obtained
by  gluing  them along  common subspaces;  it  is  a  generalized  union  operator.  Taking  a
colimit is a natural condition since the functor @A defines a big diagram whose arrows are
the triples (f :  X → Y,  x ∈ X@A,  y ∈ Y@A) with  y ◦ f =  x.  The colimit object  � of such a
diagram would ideally replace the functor @A by a unique isomorphism from � to A.
In the context of  the Yoneda Lemma with its  creative subcategories,  the generic
model of creativity described in the section “The Conceptual Box Structure” (section 2.3)
looks as follows:
1. Exhibiting the open question: understand the object A
2. Identifying the semiotic context: this is the category � where A has been identified 
3. Finding the question’s critical sign or concept in the semiotic context: this is A
4. Identifying the concept’s walls: this is the uncontrolled behavior of @A
5. Opening the walls: finding an objectively creative subcategory �
6. Displaying extended wall perspectives: calculate the colimit � of a creative diagram 
7. Evaluating the extended walls: try to understand A via the isomorphism � ⥲ A
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Here is the correspondence between the Yoneda setup of creativity and the Hegel
body: the paring of G/F corresponds to the pairing object functor @X/X. The object is a fact,
an abstract point in the category  �.  The corresponding functor  @X enriches the factual
object by the entire system of arrows that are gestural pointers to  X. The bosonic action
R@Z maps F to G, i.e., X to @X. Moreover, it maps S to N in the sense that it switches from the
object’s identity, its simple being S, to its nothingness, its negation in the category’s outside:
all other objects that become the domains of the functor’s arrows to X. On the other hand,
the  movement  from  @X to  the  colimit  � takes  the  gestural  aspect  back  to  its  factual
reduction,  to an object  �.  Finally,  the negation  N  comes back to  S as  a  negation of  the
negation, the object � that re-instanciates X form its negational functor.
4.  The  Hegel  body  � in  the  Concept  Architecture  of  Forms  and
Denotators
Before we discuss the form and denotator concept architecture it is important to
trace back this framework to the epistemological roots which define it as an application of
the semiotic concept architecture set up by D’Alembert and Diderot in their Encyclopédie.25
In  their  approach,  an  encyclopedia  must  comprise  three  characteristics:  unity,
completeness, and discoursivity. This means that it must realize a philosophical principle of
unified presentation of knowledge, it must represent all knowledge (what we expect from a
dictionary), and it must enable a discourse, a relational setup to compare its instances, the
latter being given by the lexicographic ordering in a dictionary. This triple characteristic
was interpreted in our form and denotator architecture by the following three character-
istics: unity was realized by the principle that concepts refer to other concepts, a recursive
typology. Completeness was realized by a complete set of types of references. Discoursivity
was realized by linear order and recombination of concepts.
Given these principles, a denotator is a conceptual instance in a space, called form.
We refer to The Topos of Music26 for details and just recall the relevant features here. A deno-
tator has coordinates, i.e., denotators to whom it refers, much as its form has coordinator
forms to which it also refers. This is the recursive principle. It is the gestural aspect of this
architecture. Moreover, the spatial aspect is covered by the referential typology: in topos
25 Cf. SYLVAN AUROUX, La sémiotique des encyclopédistes: essaye d’épistémologie historique des sciences du langage, Paris,
Payot, 1979;  JEAN BAPTISTE LE RONDE D’ALEMBERT,  Discours préliminaire des Editeurs, Paris, 1751 (Encyclopédie ou
Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers, I); G. MAZZOLA, The Topos of Music. Geometric Logic
of Concepts, Theory, and Performance, cit., II, § 6.1.
26 Cf. G. MAZZOLA, The Topos of Music, cit.
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theory, it is the three basic space types of limit, colimit, and powerset. Time is realized in
the trajectory of gestures you have to perform to reach a denotator’s recursive ingredients.
Facticity is obtained when you reach the leaves of the denotator’s (and the form’s) recursive
tree. Being is realized by the denotator’s entire instance, while nothingness is realized by
the linear ordering within the denotator system: the relation to what a denotator (or form)
is not, what comes before and what comes after that instance.
This makes evident that the denotator and form concept architecture, which is the
most general existing approach to precise conceptualization, and which has been imple-
mented in music software with great success,27 complies perfectly with the Hegel body �. It
is  an  open  question  to  understand  the  Hegel  action  � in  this  situation.  However,  the
exchange of time and space could be realized using the equivalence of breadth-first and
depth-first search in forms that are built from iterated limits.
5. The Usage of � for the Dynamics of Creativity
The usage of the Hegel action for the dynamics of creativity is a multiple one. On the
one hand, we can conceive it as a diagnostic tool without necessarily acting as a generator
of creative extensions. On the other hand, it can be thought as a machine (though not a
dead algorithm) that enables creative extensions. We want to discuss these two directions
which, of course, are not exclusive: a good diagnosis can induce a creative extension, and
the extensional spectrum can reveal quite a bit about the “patient’s” health.
5.1 Two Preliminary Examples
Example 2.  Let us give a first example of  a  diagnostic functionality of  the Hegel
action: Einstein’s invention of a multiple time concept. Within our creative process scheme
as displayed in section 2.3 (“The Conceptual Box Structure”), the critical concept is physical
“time”, time in the semiotic context of physics — not the primordial time concept which is
part  of  the  Hegel  body.  Let  us  take  this  concept  as  it  was  given  before  Einstein’s
in(ter)vention. When we inspect the walls of  S and of  N, it turns out that this concept is a
singleton,  it  has  no  other  copies  out  there,  i.e.,  its  non-being  N is  empty.  In  terms  of
grammar it is a singular being. Taking time and throwing it out to N by the transformation
G@F yields nothingness.  This  diagnosis  generates the question “Why only one time”? Is
there  a  physical  reason  for  supporting  this  singularity  of  the  concept?  And  Einstein’s
27 See  GERARD MILMEISTER,  The  Rubato  Composer  Music  Software:  Component-Based  Implementation  of  a  Functorial
Concept Architecture, Heidelberg, Springer, 2009.
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answer was that physical time could exist in a multiplicity of times, one for every inertial
system, and that the gesture of  throwing one such time instances to its  nothingness in
another inertial system would be realized through the famous Lorentz transformation.
Example 3. A second diagnostic example is the invention of the 3M Post-It, a creative
process that has been analyzed in detail in the fourth chapter of  Musical Creativity.28 Here
the critical concept is “adhesive”; its inventor, 3M chemist Dr. Spencer Silver, had created a
substance that did not glue as required, but only “half of it”. This time the gestural wall will
be inspected: what are the concept’s components (recall  the referential characteristic of
concepts discussed in section 4 – “The Hegel body � in the Concept Architecture of Forms
and  Denotators”  –,  as  suggested  by  D’Alembert  and  Diderot)?  One  of  them  is  that  an
adhesive must glue. This gluing concept’s architecture in turn has a way of being that in its
becoming has no further reference: it is a final fact, i.e., either gluing or not gluing, tertium
non datur. This was exactly the point of the diagnosis that Dr. Silver learned from his friend
Arthur Fry: there is no deeper reason to terminate the concept’s reference tree on that final
“glue” as opposed to “not glue”. Gluing by 50% was introduced as a deeper conceptual refer-
ence: gluing with a percentage. The commercial success of this new adhesive proved that
this creative conceptual extension was the right thing to do. In terms of denotator theory,
the conceptual component of gluing that was given as a Boolean value was replaced by a
real number value.
Evidently, the present state of the art is far from what one could coin an expert
system. But this is not surprising since the full meaning of the Hegel action must be elabo-
rated with respect  to  a variety  of  semiotic  contexts  for creative processes.  However,  it
seems evident  that  a  number of  core  questions  around a  concept  can be  built  to  open
conceptual walls more easily.
28 Cf. G. MAZZOLA - J. PARK - F. THALMANN, Musical Creativity. Strategies and Tools in Composition and Improvisation, cit.,
pp. 17-19.
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5.2 The Challenge: Creating a Spectrum of Conceptual Extensions
In Musical Creativity,29 creativity has been described as a process that takes place in a
specific semiotic context. And the result of such a process is viewed as an extension of the
given semiotic body. Creativity adds expression, signification and content. It is not a formal
combinatorial game. Such an extension entails several critical aspects:
1. It need not to be a successful extension. For example, adding a color to mathematical
symbols would very probably not solve any mathematical problem. Therefore the
semiotic extension might be useless for the time being, but, in the long run, it might
turn out to be a good move. This means that creativity should also be judged in the
global perspective of the evolution of a semiotic system. This resembles biological
evolution, where a local change might show its advantage or disadvantage only after
a longer period of further evolution.
2. The  conceptual  extension,  following  the  Hegel  action,  say,  need  not  be  unique.
Opening walls  might  create an entire  “spectrum” of  conceptual  extension which
need not contradict each other. For example, the recent extension of counterpoint
theory  as  described  in  Computational  Counterpoint  Worlds contains  a  variety  of
conceptual  extension  of  what  are  consonances  and  dissonances  within  the  12-
chromatic  pitch  class  system,  but  simultaneously  extends  to  microtonal  pitch
systems.30
3. Applying the Hegel action to a critical concept C is a manifold endeavor. For every
one  X  of the six walls, one may create a conceptual extension  �(X). If one applies
several extensions in a certain order, �(X1, X2, … Xn), say, it is probably not true that
another extension following a permuted order, �(Xπ(1),  Xπ(2), … Xπ(n)), would yield the
same result.
29 Cf. ibidem.
30 Cf. OCTAVIO ALBERTO AGUSTIN-AQUINO - JULIEN JUNOD - GUERINO MAZZOLA, Computational Counterpoint Worlds, Heidelberg,
Springer, 2015.
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Despite these general questions we should present a more concrete example of a
conceptual spectrum created following the Hegel action. Our example relates to the oper-
ation  S@N = (RZ)(GF). In mathematical gesture theory,31 one considers hypergestures, i.e.,
gestures  h :  Γ → ∆@⃗X starting at the digraph Γ (their  skeleton) and targeting to the topo-
logical category ∆@⃗X of all gestures of skeleton ∆ which target to the topological category X.
The Escher theorem32 then states that we have an isomorphism of topological categories
Escher: Γ@⃗∆@⃗X ⥲ ∆@⃗Γ@⃗X. This means that we may exchange the roles of the two skeleta Γ,
∆. In other words: the gesture  h which maps curve parameters to gestures  qua points in
∆@⃗X can be reinterpreted as a gesture where the points now become gestures and vice
versa.  This  is  exactly  what  the  symmetry S@N does:  it  exchanges  G and  F.  And it  also
exchanges R and Z, which in the Escher setup makes sense since the space of gestural facts
in ∆@⃗X is transformed into the time parametrization of gestures of ∆@⃗Γ@⃗X.  The Escher
procedure therefore enables us to reinterpret gestures within concepts in permuted ways,
and thereby create new meanings. For example, a hypergesture defined by a line of circles
can  be  reinterpreted  as  a  hypergesture  defined  by  a  circle  of  lines.  This  can  yield  a
completely  new  understanding  of  a  given  concept.  In  music  theory,  first  species
counterpoint can be viewed as a circle that connects (within the pitch class circle) the line
of the cantus firmus to the line of discantus. But the Escher permutation of roles would view
this counterpoint as a time line of intervals, and therefore as a completely different under-
standing of what counterpoint means.
The Escher theorem is an extremely explicit key to the Hegel action using the S@N
operation. It would be interesting to search for Escher-like theorems which relate to the
other two Hegel actions.
31 Cf. G. MAZZOLA - M. ANDREATTA, Diagrams, Gestures and Formulae in Music, cit.; G. MAZZOLA, Categorical Gestures, the
Diamond Conjecture, Lewin’s Question, and the “Hammerklavier” Sonata, cit.
32 Cf. ibidem, section 2.4. 
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5.3  Escher’s  Theorem for  Beethoven’s  Fanfare  in  the  Hammerklavier
Sonata op. 106
We want to illustrate the creative movement as it can be interpreted using the above
Escher technique as an expression of the S@N operation with a concrete example: the initial
fanfare of Beethoven’s Hammerklavier sonata op. 106, see Figure 4. The fanfare’s rhythmical
structure is shown to the right, it consists of eight points in the plane of onset and duration.
The first gesture is a line from A to B, a halting gesture A → B, see Figure 5.
In  a  hypergesture  ρ,  this  gesture  is  mapped  to  the  repeated  halting  gesture
ρ(A)  → ρ(B).  The  hypergesture  ρ connects  to  a  repetition  of  a  halting  gesture.  To  this
moment, the fanfare is nothing but a not so creative confirmation of the initial gesture’s
being, namely the movement of A → B to ρ(A) → ρ(B). The creative action takes place when
Beethoven’s  construction  exchanges  the  gestural  and  the  factual  roles,  following  the
methodology described above. The factual A → B becomes the gestural part in ρ′, whereas
the gestural movements A → ρ(A) and B → ρ(B) become the factual parts. This is the Escher
isomorphism, applied to  ρ, i.e.  ρ′ = Escher(ρ). A simple topological deformation generates
the second hypergesture  σ. Observe that this latter hypergesture cannot be generated by
direct deformation of ρ since it has a different orientation.
This Hegelian action exchanges the roles of duration and onset in the sense that a
repetition  of  a  halting  gestures  becomes  the  halting  of  a  repetition gesture.  This  truly
Escherian flipping movement gives the fanfare its full power. Although this example is a
microscopic structure, it proves that creativity can have its germinal force in elementary
compositional  structures.  We have shown in our  article  Categorical  gestures,  the  diamond
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conjecture, Lewin’s question, and the “Hammerklavier” sonata33 that this construction is not an
isolated creation, but does shape the structure of the dramatic modulation E flat major ↝ D
major/B minor, mm. 189-197 of the first movement.
5.4 The Rotation S@N as a Driving Creative Force in the Incipit of Liszt’s
Mephisto Walzer No. 1
An example of  the rotation  S@N =  (RZ)(GF)  can be found in the structure of  the
Mephisto Walzer No. 1 by Franz Liszt. The beginning of this composition presents a gesture of
harmonic enrichment by the addition of fifths that attributes a harmonic role to the initial
musical figure (a repeated tone E introduced by an acciaccatura D sharp). The pedal note, E,
is followed by a sequence of concatenated fifths in an accelerated rhythm that highlights
this process. Moreover, a second compositional gesture transforms the first theme into a
second one, an intensely used sequence that develops within the score.
In this composition, rhythmical and harmonic movements are linked in an insep-
arable way. In the first bar we have the silence, a kind of mental preparation of the initial
gesture.  In the  Hegel  group interpretation,  this  silence could be  viewed as  nothingness
before being. Nothingness becomes then an integral part of the artistic work.
33 Cf. ibidem, § 5.4.
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Fig.  5: The initial rhythmical hypergesture ρ of the fanfare is transformed
into the hypergesture  ρ  via the Escher isomorphism, and then deformed′
into the target hypergesture σ of the fanfare.
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The initial gesture consists of an ostinato rhythm � = D sharp-E-E-E, where the last
two E notes are played as an echo of the initial one, see Figure 6. The rhythm is presented
firstly in the extended form �0 = D sharp-E-E-E-E-E-E. In measures 4-5 we have the reduced
sequence  � =  D sharp-E-E-E,  obtained  from  �0 by  an  operator  of  horizontal  reduction,
h :  �0 ⟼ h(�0) = �. The following measures 6, 10, and 12, present the ostinato �0, together
with its  second half  �′ =  E-E-E (a second horizontal  reduction  �′ =  E-E-E =  h′(�0))  on a
superposition of fifths: B, F sharp, C sharp. This kind of harmonic extension results from an
operator  of  vertical  completion  of  the  fifth  sequence.  Measure  by  measure,  we  have  a
concatenation of sequence �0, �, and �′. The “factual” harmonic fifth sequence in the pitch
class  space ℤ12 is deployed as a “time gesture” by the  ostinato rhythm. Therefore the first
part  of  the  creative  process  consists  of  an  extension  of  the  initial  gesture  in  time,
contextualizing  the  harmonic  environment  in  the  gesture  �.  This  realizes  the  Hegel
transformation S@N = (FG)(RZ).
Let  us  shortly  discuss  the  harmonic  display here.  Recall  that  diatonic  scales  are
defined using six consecutive fifths. This harmonic structure is a spatial one in the space ℤ12
of pitch classes. Although a sequence of fifths has already a temporal potentiality, the ana-
lyzed movement is still spatial (e.g. T7(E) = A, where T7(x) = x+7 is the fifth transposition). In
our  case,  the measures  2-14 show a first  ascending fifth sequence E-B-F sharp-C sharp,
followed by a second descending sequence A-D-G, yielding a complete total of G-D-A-E-B-F
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Fig. 6: A piano roll representation of mm. 2-28 of Liszt’s Mephisto Walzer No. 1. Measures 1 and
29 are omitted since they are both tacet and surround the music by a nothingness of silence.
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sharp-C sharp that defines D major. Liszt has succeeded in defining the harmonic basis of D
major  in  a  rhythmically  triggered  gesture.  In  measure  18,  the  chord  with  dynamics
«f marcato» is composed as a symmetrical part around E, i.e. D-A-E-B-F sharp. The couple E-E
is  then the inferior  and superior limit  of  this  chord.  This  again confirms the inversion
symmetry of D major around E.
Following the key signature (three sharps), the pedal note E could appear as the
dominant of A major. However, this is not the case, since A major does not appear until m.
111. In mm. 2-27, E plays the role of second degree of D major. Then, in turn, in m. 28 D
appears as the second degree of C major, in fact, almost unexpectedly appears a C in m. 28
that is confirmed in the following measures 30-34. The B of the left hand (m. 27) moves
towards C (m. 28) as a leading tone. This movement suggests the effect of a “ghost note” to
the superior melodic line:  D → C,  see Figure 7. Summarizing, after the long preparation
E → D as II → I in D major, we have another interpretation (this time virtual) II → I as D → C.
Tone E has still a relevant role for C major, being the symmetric pitch of the tonic with
respect to the C major inversion symmetry around D, and it continues to act as a pedal in
the reprise of the initial gesture (m. 35).
In  mm.  17-18,  the  rhythmical  and  harmonic  developments  are  completed  by  a
“melodic creation”.  It  is  the birth of  a  melodic motive  δ =  D-A-E-A (with an initial  rest
rhythm, and a sequence of quaver-quaver-crochet-quaver). In Figure 6 the notes of δ and its
rarefaction are highlighted by red lines. Mm. 20-26 present a progressive rarefaction of this
fragment.  Gesture  δ will  be then modified by transposition and variation of intervals in
mm. 93-94, generating  δ1,  see Figure 8. In m. 97 we will  have a fusion of the head of  �
(D sharp-E) and the tail of δ1. This hybrid is followed by a new sequence of fifths, where E is
effectively the dominant of A. A new version of δ, named δ2, affirms clearly the tonality of
A major.
– 93 –
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m. 28.
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Finally, in m. 29 we have the silence, symmetrically with the silence in m. 1. It is a
gesture from the nothing to the being, and back to the nothing of silence, full of potentiality
and tension. Rarefaction of tones corresponds to a dilation of rhythmical figures.
Summarizing, in the incipit of Mephisto Walzer, two creative gestures are evident:
1. rhythmic-harmonic deployment of �0 and its two parts �, �′ in the circle of fifths of
D major,
2. birth of δ through a deforming gesture of � within its repositioning on the circle of
fifths (rhythmic/harmonic variation).
Thus, the rhythmic structure unfolds through time the spatial relations of harmony.
The factuality of abstract points is unfolded in a gestural transformation in time, realizing
the Hegelian creative  action  S@N =  (RZ)(GF).  The rhythm is  the generative  force  of  the
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Fig.  8: In the  Mephisto Walzer by Franz Liszt, the first gesture  �, is progressively
repeated and translated in superposed fifths. The main theme δ, comes from these
fifths played this time melodically. A transition gesture with the head of � and the
tail of δ leads to δ1 and then to δ2, the varied theme in A major.
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transformations R → Z, F → G. The action of deforming � into δ is a movement generated by
the rhythm and by the mapping of the circle of fifths into time.
6. An Experimental Composition
Let us try to compose a little musical piece using the Hegel model. It will be obtained, via
S@N transformations, a little melody from an elementary gesture, see Figure 9.
The creativity model that we have defined can potentially describe all mechanism of
artwork production. In the previous examples, the interest of analyzing pages of Beethoven
and Liszt was given by the evidence of the construction principle. In these examples is not
only evident the artistic ”fact” but also the path of its creation.  Mephisto Walzer does not
start with the fifths already superposed and with the  δ theme that dominates, but Liszt
prepared the entry of the main theme revealing the very mechanism of construction.
One  could  observe  that,  sometimes,  the  artist  can  produce  an  artwork  without
making all steps explicit: it is the case of “sudden inspiration”. This case also complies with
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Fig.  9:  The  little  composition  The  Hegel  Song has  been  composed  starting  from an
elementary gesture and its variations constructed via the rotation S@N = (RZ)(GF). This
composition shows that fundamental compositional processes, variation and thematic
development, can be easily obtained using the Hegel action.
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our creativity model since inspiration could be correlated to a time compression of steps
within the Hegel scheme. These steps, even reduced to instants, must be defined.
A score contains a musical fact. Musicians’ educated hands can realize such a fact via
appropriate gestures.  Playing fingers are like a dancer,  which moves from one point to
another: dance is not characterized by the targeted points, but by the trajectory to reach
them. Recall Poincaré’s citation in section 2.2 (“The Implicit Group Structure”). Gestures
define the dynamics to reach these points. The choice of time and space (meter/tempo and
keys),  explicit  in  the  musical  score,  contains  all  the  required  information  to  allow the
hands’ movements. Then, if we want to create a different musical fact, we may deform the
used gesture, i.e., connecting it through a hypergestural line to a new gesture. A way to
deform a gesture is by changing meter/tempo (Z) and notes (R). Time is the driving force,
while notes are the “target” and thus the factual endpoints of any gesture. If  a gesture
terminates in an endpoint, the following gesture – that germinates from the preceding one
at this endpoint – is connected to it via a hypergesture relation.
In our little example of a composition, realized using the Hegel group scheme, we
will use meter/tempo and pitch indications to allow the pianist to create and annihilate the
small beings commonly called “musical phrases”. It is true that a lot of music is written with
meter/tempo  and  pitch;  however,  in  this  case  we  intentionally  start  from  a  primitive
gesture, named �, without any precise meter/tempo indication, to represent the zero level
of  the  pianist’s  action.  A  sequence  of  rotations  around  S –  N axis  will  generate  the
permutations (RZ) and (GF), and we will obtain a little melody.
In the case of a pianist – as already mentioned in the discussion of Liszt’s Mephisto
Walzer, where two notes are hit in the beginning – the primitive gesture here, �, is a simple
hitting of a key with one finger. This maps the spatial fact of a note symbol to a gesture in
time. Repeating the same note means doubling this elementary gesture: 2�. This repetition
expresses  time in  a  simple  movement  with a  new characteristic  of  the  note  gesture  as
opposed to the timeless note symbol:  � can be positioned at different times. Some repe-
titions of � and 2� yield n�. Until now, there is no quantification of time, and the gesture is
localized on the same key. This unarticulated sequence of gestures must be connected and
modified in order to generate a meaningful musical composition. Connected structures in
music is realized via connected gestures. The same gesture, if repeated at regular intervals
(time Z, in a 2/4 meter in our example) and shifted in particular points (space R), leads us
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some  musical  facts,  different  but  related  by  a  common  origin.  This  yields  the  step
n� ⟼ n�(t); pitch space is deployed along time.
Until now, we have only couple of quavers; by doubling gestures we obtain a group of four
notes, �2. In order to enrich the musical discourse, we can deform this simple scheme of four repeated
notes. A different choice of spatial endpoints, a R transformation, deforming the hand gesture form,
modifies the ribattuto notes into a more articulated sequence; thus R : �2 ⟼ �  2. For example, the
sequence  G-G-G-G  becomes  C  sharp-B-D-B.  Such  sequences  are  typical  for  Bach’s  keyboard
compositions;  perhaps its  simplicity  and universality  derives from these simple deformations  of
primitive gestures.
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Fig.  10: The experimental composition  The Hegel Song, created by Maria Mannone. Black:  �3–, red:  �4,
blue: �4+, green: contour preserving deformation, yellow: metrical change 3/8 ⟼ 6/8.
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In Figure 9, �3 is obtained from �  2 by time modification 4/4 ⟼ 3/4, and �  3– from
�  3 by the  suppression of the second note of each couple, realized by a “jumping” hand
gesture. Transition t from �  3– to � 4 is again a change of meter 3/4 ⟼ 3/8. Transition from
� 4 to � 4+ is a transformation of time (rests) to space, filling up empty time. Transition from
� 4+ to  �  4+ is  a  spatial  contour preserving deformation. Transition  �  4+ to  �5 is  a  third
change of meter 3/8 ⟼ 6/8. Finally, we will then use a Z transformation of �   5 to modify
some group of three quavers into a pointed crochet (�′5). In the new sequence we have a
little cantabile melody. The transformations applied are an Hegelian-gestural equivalent of
variational  and  developing  strategies  used  by  composers.  In  this  way  we  have  just
completed a little musical clockwork, The Hegel Song as displayed in Figure 10.
7. Still More Symmetries? Future Developments
Reviewing  the  Hegel  group  �,  one  might  be  tempted  to  extend  it  to  the  full
symmetry group of  the Hegel  body  �,  i.e.,  the automorphism group of  this  octahedron.
There are two types of such automorphisms: (1) Geometric movements, elements of the
special orthogonal group  SO(3,  ℝ) of 3D space, such as the 1200 rotation around the axis
through the centers of the triangles R, G, S and Z, F, N, see Figure 11. (2) Automorphisms in
the orthogonal group O(3, ℝ) with determinant –1, such as the inversion –Id = (GF)(RZ)(SN)
which  exchanges  all  our  conceptual  pairs.  Why  should  one  reject  the  first-case  auto-
morphisms that are not in �? One reason could be that they have no fix-points, or, in other
words: they are not bosonic actions generated by a selection of fermions, such as  R@Z. A
reason for avoiding automorphisms with determinant –1 (the case 2 above) could be that a
change  of  orientation  of  the  Hegel  body  � could  be  forbidden  because  human
conceptualization is  fundamentally  using orientation,  whatever that  could mean in this
embryonal state of mind.
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We are not aware of any philosophical interpretation of additional symmetries, but
the intrinsic geometry of  � might create new aspects that could not have been conceived
without  this  geometric  rendering.  Together  with  the  problem  of  proving  Escher-type
theorems for (SN) and (RZ), this is a subject of future investigations.
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Fig.  11:  Additional  symmetries  of  the  Hegel  body  might  be
considered,  but  at  present,  no  philosophical  interpretation  is
given.
